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‘NO	  FAULT	  OUSTER’:	  TRANSITION	  TO	  A	  MORE	  CONTEMPORARY	  
UNDERSTANDING	  OF	  SOCIETY?	  KATE	  GALLOWAY*	  I INTRODUCTION	  When	   I	   first	   started	  working	   as	   an	   articled	   clerk	   in	   1990,	   it	  was	   the	   accepted	  practice	  in	  a	  purchase	  of	  land	  by	  husband	  and	  wife	  (or	  man	  and	  woman)	  to	  cite	  the	  interests	  to	  be	  held	  as	  joint	  tenants	  if	  no	  instructions	  were	  forthcoming	  –	  this	  was	  the	  default	  interest	  and	  there	  was	  little	  concern	  over	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  parties.	  	  Instructions	  were	  almost	  always	  obtained	  from	  the	  husband,	  leaving	  the	  woman	   as	   a	   silent	   partner	   in	   the	   transaction.	   	   This	   always	   struck	   me	   as	   old-­‐fashioned	   –	   it	   was	   problematic	   and	   I	   went	   to	   great	   lengths	   with	   my	   long-­‐suffering	  clients	  to	  seek	  explicit	  instructions	  from	  each	  party.	  Subsequently,	  President	  Kirby’s	  dissent	  in	  Foregeard	  v	  Shanahan	  resonated	  with	  me.	   	   This	   case	   involved	   the	   competing	   rights	   of	   disputing	   co-­‐owners.	   	   Kirby	  criticized	  the	  law’s	  approach	  to	  co-­‐owners,	  saying	  that	  ‘most	  of	  the	  “rules”	  were	  developed	  long	  before	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  phenomena	  to	  which	  the	  statute	  (the	  
Conveyancing	  Act	  partition	  provisions)	  must	  now	  typically	  apply.’1	  	  	  He	   cited	   widespread	   ownership	   of	   real	   property	   by	   working	   people	   and	   by	  women,	  availability	  of	  credit	  and	  high	  numbers	  of	  de	  facto	  married	  relationships.	  	  In	   these	   contemporary	   social	   circumstances,	   he	   argued	  against	   a	   replication	  of	  the	  old	  rules	  that	  were	  developed	  in	  another	  era.	  His	  comments	  have	  shown	  themselves	  to	  be	  prescient	  with	  the	  handing	  down	  of	  the	  decision	  in	  Callow	  v	  Rupchev2	  almost	  exactly	  12	  months	  ago.	  Callow	  v	  Rupchev	  involved	  co-­‐owners	  seeking	  an	  order	  for	  sale	  of	  their	  property.	  	  What	   was	   in	   dispute	   was	   whether	   occupation	   rent	   would	   be	   payable	   by	   the	  occupying	  party	   to	   the	  non-­‐occupying	  party.	   	  As	  a	  general	  principle,	   the	   law	   is	  that	   an	   occupying	   co-­‐owner	   has	   no	   such	   liability.	   	   This	   reflects	   the	   unity	   of	  possession	  of	  co-­‐owners	  –	  there	  can	  be	  no	  trespass	  where	  each	  co-­‐owner	  has	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  B	  Econ,	  LLB,	  LLM,	  Lecturer,	  School	  of	  Law,	  James	  Cook	  University,	  Cairns.	  1	  Foregeard	  v	  Shanahan	  (1994)	  35	  NSWLR	  206,	  211.	  2	  [2009]	  NSWCA	  148	  (unreported,	  Beazley	  JA,	  Basten	  JA,	  Handley	  AJA,	  17	  June	  2009).	  
right	  of	  occupation	  of	  the	  whole	  in	  common	  with	  the	  other.	  	  The	  two	  exceptions	  to	  this	  were	  an	  ouster	  –	  a	  wrongful	  exclusion	  by	  one	  of	  the	  other	  –	  and	  a	  claim	  for	  expenditure	  on	   improvements.	   	   In	   the	   latter	  case,	  equity	  would	  require	   the	  occupying	  party	  seeking	  equity	  also	  to	  do	  equity.	  
Callow	  v	  Rupchev	  found	  what	  it	  described	  as	  a	  ‘new’	  principle:	  that	  where	  it	  was	  not	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  the	  parties	  to	  continue	  to	  occupy	  the	  property	   jointly,	  the	   occupying	   party	  would	   be	   liable	   for	   occupation	   rent	   to	   the	   non-­‐occupying	  party.	  What	   I	   seek	   to	  do	   today	   is	   to	   assess	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   this	   is	   indeed	  a	   ‘new’	  principle.	   	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   understanding	   the	   type	   of	   approach	   the	   court	   is	  suggesting.	  Traditionally,	  the	  court	  looks	  at	  the	  parties’	  rights	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  proprietary	  interests.	  	  However	  what	  Callow	  v	  Rupchev	  is	  suggesting,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  relevant	   to	   look	   instead	   at	   the	   parties’	   personal	   circumstances	   –	   personalizing	  the	  impersonal.	  First,	  some	  background.	  I’ve	  said	  that	  traditionally	  the	  court	  looks	  at	  proprietary	  interests	  in	  determining	  rights	  as	  between	  an	  occupying	  and	  a	  non-­‐occupying	  co-­‐owner.	   	  Because	  the	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  parties’	  interests,	  namely	  a	  right	  to	  possession	  in	  common,	  one	  party	  foregoing	  possession	  is	  not	  entitled	  to	  compensation.	  This	   is	  based	  on	  an	  assumption	  that	   there	   is	  no	  reason	  why	  the	  non-­‐occupying	  owner	  would	  stay	  away.	  	  The	  exception	  that	  interests	  us	  is	  that	  of	  ouster.	  	  Where	  the	   occupying	   party	   has	   wrongfully	   excluded	   the	   other,	   then	   liability	   for	  occupation	  rent	  will	  arise.	  	  	  Martin	  J	  in	  Beresford	  v	  Booth	  pointed	  out	  that:	  whichever	  way	  the	  matter	  is	  approached,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  law	  seeks	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  respondent	  is	  not	  unfairly	  prejudiced	  by	  reason	  of	  being	  excluded	  or	  ousted	  from	  the	  property.	  	  Either	  she	  should	  not	  be	  obliged	  to	  contribute	  any	  amount	  toward	  the	  expenses	  incurred	  during	  the	  relevant	  period,	  or	  the	  applicant	  should	  be	  required	  to	  pay	  half	  a	  reasonable	  rent	  
which	  would	  then,	  in	  theory,	  be	  available	  to	  the	  respondent	  to	  pay	  for	  or	  contribute	  to	  her	  share	  of	  the	  expenses.3	  The	  idea	  of	  wrongful	  exclusion	  has	  however,	  in	  a	  long	  line	  of	  cases,	  been	  a	  fairly	  limited	  one.	  The	  most	  oft-­‐cited	  reason	  for	  exclusion	  is	  ‘force,	  violence	  or	  threats	  of	  violence’4.	  	  And	   it’s	   easy	   to	   understand	   this	   as	   a	   ‘legal	   wrong’	   resulting	   in	   compensation.	  	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  occupying	  party	  changing	  the	  locks	  thus	  denying	  access.	  There	  have	  however	  been	  a	  couple	  of	  cases	   that	  seem	  a	   little	  at	  odds	  with	   this	  interpretation.	   	   The	   first	   is	   the	   English	   case	   of	   Dennis	   v	   McDonald,	   which	   is	  usually	  cited	  as	  authority	  in	  support	  of	  violence	  as	  wrongful	  exclusion.	  	  In	  Dennis	  v	  McDonald,	  the	  court	  said	  that	  	  the	   basic	   principle…	   [no	   liability	   for	   occupation	   rent]	   does	   not	   apply	   in	  the	   case	   where	   an	   association	   similar	   to	   a	  matrimonial	   association	   has	  broken	  down	  and	  one	  party	  is,	  for	  practical	  purposes,	  excluded	  from	  the	  family	  home.5	  	  	  The	   context	   in	   this	   case	   was	   one	   of	   violence,	   and	   the	   court	   found	   that	   the	  defendant’s	  acts	  of	  violence	  were	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  defendant’s	  expulsion	  from	  the	  property.	   	   However	   the	   underlying	   principle	   cited	   was	   wider	   than	   finding	  wrongful	  exclusion	  through	  violence	  itself.	  	  	  This	  decision	  was	  cited	  with	  approval	  in	  the	  Queensland	  decision	  Re	  Thurgood.6	  	  Here,	   the	   court	   said	   that	   it	   was	   not	   a	   case	   where	   the	   applicant	   ‘voluntarily	  abstains	  from	  using	  commonly	  owned	  property’7	  –	  the	  respondent	   ‘intended	  to	  exclude	  him	  from	  the	  house	  by	  whatever	  means	  were	  available	  to	  her.’8	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Beresford	  v	  Booth	  [1999]	  SASC	  166	  (unreported,	  Martin	  J,	  16	  April	  1999),	  [43].	  4	  Halsbury’s	  Laws	  of	  Australia	  (para	  355-­‐11620),	  cited	  in	  Beresford	  v	  Booth	  [1999]	  SASC	  166	  (Unreported,	  Martin	  J,	  16	  April,	  1999),	  [49].	  5	  [1982]	  Fam	  63,	  71.	  6	  (1987)	  QConvR	  54-­‐239,	  57,631.	  7	  Ibid,	  57,632.	  8	  Ibid,	  57,630.	  
In	  Re	  Thurgood,	   the	   court	   emphasized	   the	   ‘continued	  unpleasantness’,	   coupled	  with	  the	  threat	  of	  the	  male	  applicant	  being	  ‘submitted	  to	  the	  indignity	  of	  having	  the	   police’	   called	   in.9	   	   This	   decision	   is	   often	   represented	   as	   authority	   for	  exclusion	  via	  threats	  of	  violence10	  and	  indeed	  there	  were	  threats	  of	  violence	  that	  resulted	   in	   the	   applicant	   ceasing	   to	   occupy	   the	   premises.	   	   However	   in	   citing	  
Dennis	  v	  McDonald,	  the	  court	  instead	  focuses	  on	  ‘breakdown	  of	  the	  association’.11	  	  	  Likewise,	   in	  Hummelstad	   v	   Hicks	   the	   court	   recognised	   that	   ‘unfortunately	   the	  personal	  and	  social	  problems	  resulting	   from	  the	   fact	   that	  both	   [parties	  shared]	  occupancy…have	  [blurred]	  the	  legal	  rights	  and	  obligations	  of	  the	  parties	  arising	  out	  of	   their	   co-­‐ownership…’	   12	   	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   ‘practical	   effect’	   of	   the	  plaintiff	  changing	  the	  locks,	  amounted	  to	  an	  ouster.13	  It	  is	  this	  ‘blurring	  of	  legal	  rights	  and	  obligations’	  that	  interests	  me.	  	  As	  I	  have	  read	  these	  cases	  over	  the	  years	  it	  has	  always	  struck	  me	  that	  the	  courts	  have	  seemed	  to	  struggle	  with	  relationship	  breakdown	  inevitably	  involved	  in	  these	  ‘ouster’	  cases.	  	  While	   there	   has	   been	   an	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	   parties’	   personal	  circumstances,	  short	  of	  violence	  the	  courts	  have	  seemed	  to	  be	  reluctant	  to	  adjust	  the	   parties’	   accounts	   to	   recognise	   the	   financial	   implications	   of	   relationship	  breakdown.	  While	   this	   is	  understandable	   in	  a	   context	   that	   requires	  determination	  of	   rights	  consequent	  on	  proprietary	  interests,	  in	  another	  sense	  it	  doesn’t	  work.	  	  Property	  after	   all	   is	   a	   construct	   of	   the	   times	   and	   there	   are	  many	   other	   contexts	  within	  which	  the	  law	  (usually	  through	  the	  application	  of	  equitable	  principles)	  has	  found	  a	  way	  to	  do	  justice.	   	  And	  this	   is	   indeed	  what	  the	  NSW	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  has	  now	  clearly	  articulated	  in	  Callow	  v	  Rupchev.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Ibid.	  10	  See	  eg	  Peter	  Butt,	  Land	  Law	  (2010)	  239	  11	  Re	  Thurgood	  (1987)	  Q	  ConvR	  54-­‐239,	  57,631,	  citing	  Dennis	  v	  McDonald	  [1982]	  Fam	  63,	  70-­‐71.	  	  Cf	  Chieco	  v	  Evans	  (1990)	  5	  BPR	  11,297,	  where	  Young	  J	  rejected	  this	  approach.	  	  Young	  J’s	  approach	  was	  itself	  rejected	  by	  the	  court	  in	  Biviano	  v	  
Natoli	  (1998)	  43	  NSWLR	  695.	  12	  [2006]	  NSWSC	  120	  (Unreported,	  McLaughlin	  AJ,	  7	  March	  2006),	  [23].	  13	  Hummelstad	  v	  Hicks	  [2006]	  NSWSC	  120	  (Unreported,	  McLaughlin	  AJ,	  7	  March	  2006),	  [45].	  
In	  this	  case,	  as	  in	  so	  many	  other	  ‘ouster’	  cases,	  each	  party	  made	  allegations	  as	  to	  violent	   behaviour	   of	   the	   other.	   	   However	   the	   trial	   judge	   found	   that	   the	  relationship	  was	  instead	  ‘tempestuous’.	   	  Importantly,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  found	  that	   there	  was	   ‘no	  need	  to	   identify	  violence	  or	  a	   threat	  of	  violence	  sufficient	   to	  justify	  a	  finding	  that	  departure	  of	  one	  co-­‐tenant	  was	  involuntary’.14	  	  In	  applying	  
Dennis	  v	  McDonald,	   the	  court	  identified	  this	  reasoning	  as	  formulation	  of	  a	   ‘new’	  principle:	  that	  an	  occupation	  fee	  may	  be	  set	  off	  against	  the	  claim	  of	  the	  tenant	  in	  occupation	   for	   a	   contribution	   to	   expenses	   or	   improvements	   where	   the	   co-­‐ownership	   arose	   out	   of	   a	   domestic	   relationship	   which	   has	   broken	   down	  rendering	  departure	  of	  one	  party	  reasonable	  in	  the	  circumstances.15	  In	   so	   finding,	   like	   Kirby	   P	   before	   them,	   the	   court	   reflected	   on	   the	   changes	   in	  society	   that	   required	   a	   reformulation	   of	   the	   ‘old’	   principles.	   	   While	   it	   can	   be	  suggested	  that	  the	  court	  simply	  followed	  precedent,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  said	  that	  it	  has	  made	   the	   existing	   principles	   more	   explicit.	   	   It	   does	   recognise	   the	   reality	   of	  personal	  relationships	  and	  contemporary	  property	  ownership.	  	  	  This	  decision	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  Re	  Thurgood	  and	  Dennis	  v	  McDonald.	  	  While	  the	  facts	  in	  Callow	  v	  Rupchev	  also	  occurred	  in	  the	  context	  of	  alleged	  violence,	  this	  aspect	   of	   the	   case	  was	   explicitly	   ignored	  by	   the	   court.	   	   This	   decision	   explicitly	  shifts	  the	  focus	  of	  inquiry	  from	  whether	  there	  has	  been	  behaviour	  that	  amounts	  to	   ouster	   so	   as	   to	   interfere	   with	   a	   property	   right,	   to	   the	   state	   of	   the	   parties’	  personal	  relationship.	  To	   this	   extent,	   it	   is	   submitted	   that	   the	   decision	   does	   indeed	   espouse	   a	   ‘new’	  principle.	  There	   is	   another	   interesting	   aspect	   to	   this	   decision:	   and	   that	   is	   how	   far	   this	  principle	  can	  be	  applied.	  In	   the	  2009	  English	  decision	  of	  French	  v	  Barcham,	  one	   joint	  owner	  of	  property	  was	   declared	   bankrupt.	   	   The	   joint	   owners	   remained	   in	   occupation	   of	   the	  property	  for	  some	  12	  years	  following	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  trustee	  in	  bankruptcy	  after	  which	  time	  the	  trustee	  applied	  for	  and	  got	  an	  order	  for	  sale.	  	  The	  question	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Ibid,	  [30].	  15	  Ibid	  [30].	  
before	  the	  court	  was	  whether	  an	  adjustment	  would	  be	  made	  for	  occupation	  rent	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  trustee	  –	  as	  the	  bankrupt	  and	  the	  remaining	  co-­‐owner	  had	  been	  in	  occupation	  all	  that	  time.	  Applying	  the	  ‘traditional’	  rule,	  there	  could	  be	  no	  suggestion	  of	  ouster	  (wrongful	  exclusion)	  of	   the	   trustee.	   	  There	  were	  no	   threats,	   there	  was	  no	  actual	  violence,	  there	   was	   no	   denial	   of	   title.	   	   Applying	   Luke	   v	   Luke,16	   there	   should	   be	   no	  suggestion	  that	  being	  in	  occupation	  alone	  would	  give	  rise	  to	  an	  occupation	  fee.	  	  	  And	  yet	  the	  court	  found	  that	  there	  was	  liability	  for	  occupation	  rent.	  	  The	  court’s	  focus	  was	  on	  the	  ‘reasonableness	  of	  taking	  occupation’	  rather	  than	  the	  causation	  of	  the	  exclusion.	  	  It	  was	  obviously	  not	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  the	  trustee	  to	  occupy	  the	  property	  in	  common	  with	  the	  bankrupt’s	  wife.	  	  	  I CONCLUSION	  More	  than	  one	  Australian	  court	  has	  identified	  that	  the	  genesis	  of	  principles	  of	  co-­‐ownership	  lies	  in	  another	  age	  –	  most	  recently	  in	  Callow	  v	  Rupchev.17	  	  The	  courts’	  response	   to	   this	  has	  been	   to	   shift	   their	   approach	   to	  determining	  disputes	  over	  loss	  of	  a	  right	  of	  possession	  to	  co-­‐owned	  property.	  	  	  Earlier	   cases	   started	   with	   the	   proposition	   that	   there	   was	   no	   liability	   of	   an	  occupying	   co-­‐owner	   to	   the	   other.	   	   This	   was	   based	   on	   what	   Blackburne	   J	  described	  as	   ‘the	  underlying	  assumption…that	  there	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  why	  the	  non-­‐occupying	   co-­‐owner	   should	   not	   take	   up	   occupation’.18	   	   If	   this	   is	   the	  assumption,	  and	  coupled	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  proprietary	  interest,	  it	  is	  understandable	  that	  the	  next	  issue	  would	  be	  to	  establish	  wrongful	  exclusion	  –	  particularly	  focusing	  on	  violence.	  However	   if	  one	  assumes	   instead	   that	  property	  ownership	   in	  common	   is	   in	  one	  sense	   an	   extension	   of	   a	   personal	   or	   domestic	   relationship,	   then	   where	   that	  relationship	   ends,	   there	   is	   no	   longer	   any	   underlying	   valid	   assumption	   that	   the	  non-­‐occupying	  party	  should	  take	  up	  occupation.	  	  And	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  what	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  (1936)	  36	  SRNSW	  310;	  or	  Henderson	  v	  Eason	  (1851)	  17	  QB	  701.	  17	  [2009]	  NSWCA	  148	  (unreported,	  Beazley	  JA,	  Basten	  JA,	  Handley	  AJA,	  17	  June	  2009).	  18	  French	  v	  Barcham	  [2009]	  1	  WLR	  1124,	  1138.	  
court	   is	   now	   saying	   –	   having	   identified	   that	   ‘to	   describe	   such	   a	   [relationship	  breakdown]	   as	   an	   actual	   ouster	   involves	   a	   fiction	   and	   it	   is	   better	   to	   recognise	  such	   a	   breakdown	   as	   an	   independent	   ground	   for	   charging…	   an	   occupation	  rent’.19	  The	  UK	  decisions	  have	  however	  highlighted	  where	  this	  reasoning	  can	  lead.	  	  If	  the	  underlying	   principle	   is	   one	   of	   the	   reasonableness	   of	   co-­‐occupation,	   French	   v	  
Barcham	   illustrates	   how	   this	   principle	   would	   work	   outside	   a	   relationship	  breakdown.	   	   It	   is	   likely	   that	  cases	   involving	   trustees	   in	  bankruptcy	  will	  see	   the	  next	  developments	  in	  this	  area.	  	  	  Whether	  further	  development	  of	  the	  law	  in	  this	  direction	  represents	  a	  response	  to	  ongoing	  changes	  in	  social	  conditions	  or	  public	  policy	  is	  another	  question.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Callow	  v	  Rupchev	  [2009]	  NSWCA	  148	  (Unreported,	  Beazley,	  Basten	  JJA,	  Handley	  AJA,	  17	  June	  2009),	  [46].	  
